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Abstract		The	 generateonal	 dysphoria	 associated	with	 spectacular	 society	 extends	 into	 regions	 of	 outright	aporia	when	confronted	by	the	logocentrism	of	authoritative	readings	and	tertiary	levels	of	obedi-ence	demanded	by	transcendental	hegemony.	While	a	 level	of	epistemological	 interpretivism	is,	a	
priori,	 necessary	 in	 a	milieu	 of	 frenzied	 anti-pragmatism,	 judgments	 of	 counter-conduct	must	 be	preceded	by	perspicacity	in	order	that	degrees	of	nuance	are	not	confused	with	arbitrary	placement	in	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 constitutive	 endowment.	 Soteriological	 confidence	 in	 the	 face	 of	 atomized	 con-sciousness	developed	in	post-structural	thought,	can	only	lead	to	iniquitous	commitments	to	veri-similitude	in	terms	of	what	constitutes	the	genuinely	praeter	or	obeientiam.	Modes	of	operational	disobedience	manifested	in	the	previous	century	such	as	counter-culture,	vanguardism,	and	the	cul-tural-front,	 all	 express	 such	 ontological	 ambiguities	 concerning	 prima	 facia,	 paradigmatic	 judg-ments,	 particularly	 if	 any	 strong	 theory	of	non-cognitivism	 is	 adhered	 to.	This	paper	 investigates	the	degree	to	which	Situationism,	as	a	mode	of	active	or	interrogative	counter-conduct,	might	con-tribute	to	a	specific	delineation	of	a	hierarchy	of	constitutive	endowments,	or	might,	on	the	other	hand,	only	cede	space	to	a	more	organistic	notion	of	disobedient	behaviours.*		*For	a	wieldier	and	less	pertinent	abstract,	see	Appendix	A.		
Keywords	situationism,	counter-conduct,	spectacle		 	“In	 1988,	 to	 help	 prove	 his	 case	 against	 the	 CanLit	 establishment,	 [Crad	 Kilodney]	 submitted	 a	number	of	stories	by	famous	writers	such	as	Chekhov	and	Hemingway	(names	and	titles	often	pre-posterously	changed)	to	a	CBC	Radio	literary	contest.	All	were	rejected	by	the	jury”	(Levin,	2014).	The	editors	of	 the	cultural	studies	 journal	Social	Text	similarly	 fell	prey	to	such	a	hoax	when	they	published	an	article	in	their	Spring/Summer	1996	issue	by	Alan	Sokal	which	was	“‘liberally	salted	with	nonsense,’	and	in	his	opinion	was	accepted	only	because	only	because	‘(a)	it	sounded	good	and	(b)	it	flattered	the	editors'	ideological	preconceptions’”	(Weinberg,	1996).	The	Sokal	affair	and	the	CBC	short	story	hoax	set	a	precedent	for	the	notion	that	an	important	practice	of	protest	or	dissent	can	be	expressed	 in	the	 form	of	parody,	and	such	dissent	 is	not	necessarily	recognizable	to	many	people	without	a	wider	context	or	even	confession	by	the	author.	Failure	to	initially	recognize	such	protest	is	evidence	that	people	involved	in	an	institution	and	its	discourse	have	difficulty	even	im-agining	another	kind	of	discourse	or	viewpoint.	The	critical	judgments	implied	in	aesthetic	contests,	or	 the	 application	 of	 standards	 as	 implied	 by	 professionalized	 intelligentsia	 (particularly	 in	 their	contemporary	“postmodern”	manifestations),	 invite	mockery	if	we	understand	this	mockery	as	an	
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inherent	skepticism	of	a	rarified,	enclosed	discourse	that	engages	in	continual	self-referential	acts	of	 justification.	While	 the	 abstract	 to	 this	 paper,	 for	 example,	 almost	 sounds	 like	 it	 really	means	something—it	 doesn’t.	 It’s	 gibberish,	 a	 counter-conduct	mockery	 (perhaps)	 of	 academic	 obfusca-tion.		What	appeared	to	inspire	Foucault,	in	one	of	his	1978	lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	to	search	for,	 and	coin,	 the	 term	counter-conduct	was	a	desire	 to	name	an	aspect	of	dissent	or	protest	 that	didn’t	fit	into	traditionally	accepted	aspects	of	dissident	behaviour.	And	what	may	be	the	most	im-portant	element	of	this	search	is	the	recognition	that	certain	behaviours,	though	disruptive	and	po-tentially	 revolutionary,	 are	 accounted	 for	 in	 systems	 themselves—accounted	 for,	 in	 that	 they	 are	perceived	as	inevitable,	coherent,	and,	at	some	level,	manageable	(Foucault,	1978).	Such	managea-ble	dissent	might	take	the	form	of	labour	disruptions,	marches	for	racial	equality,	or	even	academic	discourse.	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.,	for	example,	may	have	challenged	two	hundred	years	of	race	rela-tions	in	the	United	States,	but	his	efforts	were	not	cognitively	incoherent,	even	to	the	most	fervent	racists	in	Alabama	or	Mississippi.	What	is	more	difficult	to	manage,	however,	are	more	cognitively	disruptive	efforts	of	revolt,	because	such	efforts	don’t	 fit	with	normally	accounted	for	types	of	ac-tions.	This	potential	cognitive	disjunction	can	result	 from	the	 fact	 that	certain	acts	of	rebellion	or	dissent	flow	from	a	priori	understood	expectations	of	social	or	economic	relations.	The	Arab	Spring,	for	example,	may	have	disrupted	a	decades-long	authoritarian	streak,	but	as	acts	of	rebellion	it	was	easily	understood	as	part	of	a	tradition	of	protest	that	grows	out	of	an	already	comprehended	set	of	unequal	social	and	economic	relations.		“How	 can	we	 designate	 the	 type	 of	 revolts,	 or	 rather	 the	 sort	 of	 specific	web	 of	 resistance	 to	forms	of	power	that	do	not	exercise	sovereignty	and	do	not	exploit,	but	‘conduct’?”	(Foucault,	1978,	p.	266).	Given	his	general	conceptual	concerns	about	the	nature	of	power,	Foucault’s	(1978)	effort	to	find	some	explanatory	notion	for	tendencies	of	dissent	that	don’t	fit	into	the	traditional	boxes	of	economic	and	political	protest	was	an	understandable	and	 important	endeavour.1	However,	 for	a	notion	 of	 counter-conduct	 to	 be	meaningful—or	 the	 “conceptual	 hinge”	 Arnold	 Davidson	 (2011)	points	us	 to—it	would	have	 to	be	directed	at	 tendencies	of	protest	 that	are,	or	were,	 abnormally	disruptive,	that	shifted	the	stable	social	ground	in	such	a	way	that	the	common	or	customary	dis-courses	of	hegemony	were	made	to	some	degree	 incoherent	by	 the	acts	of	protest	 themselves.	 In	looking	for	some	explanatory	notion	for	tendencies	of	dissent	that	don’t	fit	into	the	traditional	box-es	of	economic	and	political	protest,	to	what	degree	must	those	tendencies	be	coherent	and	exploit-able,	and	to	what	degree	might	they	just	be	disruptive	and	destabilizing?		 They	are	movements	whose	objective	is	a	different	form	of	conduct,	that	is	to	say:	wanting	to	be	 conducted	differently,	 by	other	 leaders	 (conducteurs)	 and	other	 shepherds,	 towards	other	objectives	and	forms	of	salvation,	and	through	other	procedures	and	methods.	They	are	movements	that	also	seek,	possibly	at	any	rate,	to	escape	direction	by	others	and	to	de-fine	the	way	for	each	to	conduct	himself	(Foucault,	1978,	p.	259).		Something	 like	 the	 Sokal	 affair	 (or	 to	 be	 very	 generous,	 the	 above	 abstract),	 though	 it	 is	 a	 non-traditional	protest	and	certainly	somewhat	cognitively	disruptive,	is	also	fairly	coherent,	as	it	oper-ates	within	a	long	tradition	of	literary	mockery	and	satire.	It	might	be	expected	that	for	any	form	of	protest	to	have	a	significant	and	lasting	impact,	it	must	be	fairly	coherent	or,	to	put	it	in	terms	that	align	with	 Foucault’s	 (1978)	 original	 discussion,	 it	must	 both	 counter	 [some	 aspect	 of	 prevailing	hegemony]	 as	well	 as	 be	 conductive	 (that	 is	 to	 say,	 that	 it	must	 conduct	 people	 both	away	 from	some	tradition	AND	towards	something	else).	And	it	seems	that	most	new,	apparently	novel,	forms	of	dissent	fulfill	 these	requirements.	We	are	dealing	here,	then,	with	several	broad	and	significant	
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questions,	 including:	 how	 are	 certain	 forms	 of	 revolt	 atypical	 or	 divergent	 (“that	 could	 be	 called	specific	revolts	of	conduct”	(Foucault,	1978,	p.	259)),	do	these	forms	of	dissent	have	some	form	of	recognizable	conductivity	(that	 is,	do	 they	point	 toward	some	sort	of	alternative	order	or	vision),	and	 finally,	are	 these	 forms	of	protest	 cognitively	disruptive?	This	 final	question	 is	 important	be-cause,	 arguably,	 a	 key	motivation	 to	 adopt	 a	 new	 or	 different	 notion	 of	 dissent	 such	 as	 counter-
conduct	is	not	only	to	point	to	forms	of	power	that	‘conduct’	rather	than	exploit,	but	to	account	for	protest	efforts	that,	through	their	targeting	of	power	in	the	form	of	conducting,	for	want	of	a	better	phrase	change	the	rules	of	the	game	in	some	way,	and	by	doing	so	form	a	vanguard	of	protest	that,	at	different	times	in	history,	act	as	a	kind	of	political	unconscious	(to	borrow	a	phrase	from	Fredric	Jameson)	of	long-term	political	and	social	changes.	It’s	fair	to	say,	then,	that	we	might	need	to	think	of	examples	of	counter-conduct	on	a	spectrum	of	conductivity,	in	which	it	is	relatively	easy	to	see	a	movement’s	 disruptive	 or	 destructive	 power	 and/or	motivation,	 but	more	 difficult	 to	 see	where	such	an	effort	might	stand	in	relation	to	its	goal	of	conducting	groups	or	societies	in	specific	ways	or	directions.	“By	whom	do	we	consent	to	be	directed	or	conducted?	How	do	we	want	to	be	conducted?	Towards	what	do	we	want	to	be	led?”	(Foucault,	1978,	p.	264);	must	these	counter-conducts	offer	answers,	or	is	it	precisely	that	they	raise	such	questions	which	constitutes	their	disruptive	nature?			 The	English	Peasant	Revolt	of	1381,	for	example,	though	a	movement	that	appears	as	typical	or	customary	to	modern	political	consciousness,	was,	to	the	aristocracy	of	the	time,	cognitively	disrup-tive	in	a	significant	way	(De	Vericour,	1873).	Though	small-scale	peasant	unrest	may	have	been	par	for	the	course	in	Medieval	Europe,	the	idea	of	a	generalized	and	organized	peasant	revolt	was	still	a	novel	event	in	fourteenth	century	England	(Hampton,	1984).	When	barely	literate	tradespeople	like	Thomas	Baker,	Abel	Ker,	and	Wat	Tyler	offered	up	organized	revolt	and	specific	demands,	it	led	to	a	kind	of	moral	panic	among	the	aristocrats	(ibid.).	The	cognitive	or	paradigmatic	disruption	grew,	in	large	part,	from	the	traditional	aristocratic	perception	of	the	peasantry	as	little	more	than	a	class	of	savages.	The	aristocracy	had	believed	they	could	conduct	the	peasantry	in	much	the	same	way	the	peasantry	 conducted	 their	 sheep	 (ibid.).	Though	 such	 revolt	would	quickly	 get	 absorbed	 into	 the	realm	of	the	manageable,	expected,	and	even	conventional,	at	the	time	the	efforts	of	those	like	Tyler	were	cognitively	disruptive	in	a	way	that	might	be	difficult	for	us	to	imagine	now.			 We	now	see	the	Peasant	Revolt	as	a	standard	political	or	economic	revolt	which	fits	into	what	is	presently	a	long	history	of	such	dissent.	However,	in	the	context	of	1381,	the	peasant	leaders	were	expressing	something	relatively	new,	an	organized	class	warfare,	an	effort	that	their	masters	didn’t	even	think	them	capable	of.	On	the	other	hand,	while	the	Peasant	Revolt	was	potentially	a	form	of	counter-conduct,	 it	ultimately	drew	its	coherence	and	meaning	 from	the	way	 it	conducted	people	toward	a	new,	differently	organized,	vision.	In	this	sense,	counter-conduct	as	outlined	by	Foucault	(1978)	has	a	great	deal	to	do	with	context,	the	potential	for	acts	of	dissent	to	unbalance,	unhinge,	or	derange	conventional	lines	of	social	demarcation	(both	of	the	prevailing	hegemonic	order	as	well	as	the	commonly	accepted	patterns	and	strategies	of	dissent	and	protest).	Such	protest	may	not	even	appear	at	first	as	protest	at	all,	but	rather	simply	as	erratic,	bizarre,	or	capricious	behaviour.	Under	such	conditions,	a	social	dissonance	arises	that	can	make	both	rebellion	and	reconciliation	difficult	to	understand.		For	example,	when	Achilles	withdraws	from	the	fighting	 in	The	Iliad,	and	a	group	led	by	Odys-seus	calls	on	him	to	return	to	battle,	they	can’t	seem	to	sway	him	because	Achilles’	would-be	per-suaders	misunderstand	the	true	nature	of	his	protest.	Odysseus,	Ajax,	and	Phoenix	offer	him	gifts	and	then	talk	about	the	honours	derived	from	battle	and	the	status	that	Achilles	will	gain	from	re-turning	to	the	war.	But	Achilles	has	already	abandoned	such	notions	because	it	is	precisely	his	per-sonal	honour	that	has	been	insulted	by	Agamemnon.	Odysseus	and	his	men	are	now	operating	in	a	different	paradigm	than	Achilles	and	so	they	have	trouble	understanding	the	real	nature	of	his	pro-
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test	against	the	leader	of	the	Achaeans.	Feyerabend	(1999),	in	an	exploration	of	the	discord	in	this	Homeric	episode,	says:		 One	theory	that	has	become	rather	popular	assumes	that	languages,	cultures,	stages	in	the	development	of	a	profession,	a	tribe,	or	a	nation	are	closed	in	the	sense	that	certain	events	transcend	their	capacities.	Languages,	for	example,	are	restrained	by	rules.	Those	who	vio-late	the	rules	of	language	do	enter	new	territory;	they	leave	the	domain	of	meaningful	dis-course	(p.	20).2			In	this	interpretation	of	events,	Achilles	is	breaking	the	laws	of	Homeric	language	by	separating	the	inseparable—the	rewards	of	honour	from	honour	itself—and	thus	speaking	nonsense.	But	Feyera-bend	(1999)	contends	that,	“it	does	not	 follow	that	the	regularity	[…]	constitutes	meaning	so	that	whoever	violates	it	is	bound	to	talk	nonsense”	(p.	21).		While	the	discord	of	Achilles’	protest	might	have	unintentionally	relegated	him	to	the	margins	of	nonsensicality,	when	Alan	Sokal	submitted	an	intentionally	nonsensical	article	to	the	journal	Social	
Text,	the	editors	would	have	had	trouble	anticipating	Sokal’s	protest	because	instead	of	arriving	in	the	form	of	a	rational	critique	of	certain	kinds	of	academic	methods	or	conclusions,	 it	came	in	the	form	of	mockery	or	reverse	tribute	(Weinberg,	1996).	The	assumption	of	this	form	of	protest	is,	in	part,	the	supposition	that	to	effectively	critique	of	a	way	of	thinking	or	operating	one	needs	to	do	so	from	outside	of	the	targeted	paradigm.	A	paradigm,	whether	conceptual	such	as	postmodernism	or	more	 concrete	 such	 as	 capitalist	 relations	 of	 production,	 generates	 its	 own	 defenses	 through	bounded	(though	often	flexible)	hegemonic	discourse	and	loosely	agreed	upon	lines	of	dissent.		Such	dissent	emerges,	in	part,	out	of	a	desperate	realization	that	customary	routines	of	protest	are	not	as	effective	as	their	advocates	would	hope.	Capitalism	met	with	an	early	cognitive	challenge	in	the	form	of	Romanticism.	Shelley	(1821)	wrote	in	his	Defence	of	Poetry	that	“poetry	makes	famil-iar	objects	be	as	if	they	were	not	familiar”	(p.	282).	Given	that	Shelley	believed	that	literature	had	a	deeply	political	role	to	play	in	society	(McNiece,	1969),	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	this	kind	of	message	being	expressed	in	this	particular	way	before	the	tension	that	was	dramatically	emerging	between	burgeoning	capitalist	relations	and	the	generations	that	embraced	a	deep	suspicion	of	a	mechaniz-ing	 and	 increasingly	 technically-rationalizing	world.	M.	 H.	 Abrams	 (1971)	 noted	 that	 Coleridge’s	intellectual	effort	(particularly	 in	the	Biographia	Literaria)	 is	a	“persistent	enterprise	[…]	to	make	the	old	world	new	not	by	distorting	it,	but	by	defamiliarizing	the	familiar	through	a	refreshed	way	of	 looking	upon	 it.”	 Similarly,	Abrams	 (1971)	 said	 that	one	of	Wordsworth’s	 goals	 in	The	Prelude	was	to	condemn	“habit”	and	the	“regular	action	of	the	world.”	In	the	face	of	a	world	being	engulfed	by	what	William	Blake	(1808)	called	“dark	Satanic	Mills,”	many	of	the	Romantics	responded	by	call-ing	for	a	wise	but	childlike	view	of	the	world.	But	the	contra-vision	of	Romanticism	gave	way	in	ra-ther	short	order	to	Victorian	pride	and	narcissism.	But	for	all	the	fastidious	gentility	of	Victorian	capitalism	(or,	in	Continental	terms,	the	society	of	la	belle	époque),	the	twentieth	century	gave	rise	to	forms	of	protest	and	dissent	that	were	far	more	ambiguous	on	the	conductivity	continuum.	By	the	end	of	the	First	World	War,	anti-capitalist	protest	already	 had	 a	 fairly	 long	 and	 illustrious	 history	 that	 had	 expressed	 itself	 in	 such	movements	 as	Chartism,	the	Social	Democratic	Alliance,	the	Paris	Commune,	the	First	International,	and	the	IWW.	Though	 such	 movements	 had	 certainly	 wrestled	 reforms	 out	 of	 capitalist	 enterprise	 and	 pro-capitalist	 governments,	 by	 1914	 the	 ultimate	 outcome	 of	 international	 capitalism	 had	 been	 the	mechanized	destruction	of	WWI.		Different	forms	of	hegemony	manifest	different	varieties	of	ideological	authority	to	conduct,	and	thus	they	are	bound	to	exhibit	corresponding	(not	to	say	inevitable)	forms	of	counter-conduct.	Both	
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feudalism	and	 capitalism,	 for	 example,	 rely	 on	 some	notion	 of	 a	 “natural”	 or	 immutable	 order	 to	maintain	 the	perception	of	 their	hegemonic	 inevitability.	While	 feudalism	 relies	on	a	divinely	or-dained	 social	 hierarchy	 to	maintain	 order	 and	 avoid	 dissent,	 capitalism	 relies,	 conversely,	 on	 an	equally	 fictitious	 notion	 of	 meritocracy	 to	 justify	 its	 inequalities.	 While	 they	 rely	 on	 different	sources	for	their	certitude,	both	are	dogmatic	narratives	of	certainty	that	aim	to	maintain	order	by	underpinning	 social	 conduct	with	 a	 perception	 of	 inevitability	 in	 the	 face	 of	 potential	 class	 con-sciousness.	The	 horror	 of	 the	 First	World	War,	 and	 capitalism’s	 apparent	 failure	 to	 progress	 toward	 any-thing	but	wholesale	murder,	inspired	a	line	of	counter-conduct	that	took	dissent	out	of	the	custom-ary	lines	of	political	and	economic	protest	and	into	the	realm	of	a	cognitive	disruption	of	this	inevi-tability	in	ways	that	are	more	difficult	to	see	in	coherent	conductivity	terms	(conducting	towards).	Dada	was	the	first	emergence	of	this	line	of	dissent	in	Europe.	Dadaist	Hugo	Ball	(1916)	had	been	particularly	inspired	by	Voltaire’s	mocking	spirit	as	expressed	in	his	satirical	novella	Candide,	lead-ing	him	to	declare	that	Dada	was	his	generation’s	“Candide	against	the	times.”	But	Dada’s	derisive	critique	 against	 contemporary	 bourgeois	 values	was	 considerably	more	 biting	 that	 anything	Vol-taire	might	have	dreamed	up.	The	introduction	of	chance	or	arbitrary	caprice	into	the	artistic	pro-cess	was	not	just	an	attack	on	the	aesthetic	traditions	of	the	West,	it	was	a	reaction	to	capitalism’s	instrumental	rationalization,	a	reaction	that	inherently	questioned	the	value	of	a	rationalizing	pro-cess	 that	 had	 led	 to	 the	 epic	 tragicomedy	of	 the	War	 (Foster,	 1979).	Dada’s	 literary,	 artistic,	 and	theatrical	misbehaviours	were	intended	to	elicit	a	reaction	from	a	public	that	the	Dadaists	saw	as	complacent	 and	 inured	 to	 the	 brutality	 of	 what	 was	 supposedly	 a	 rational	 and	 evolving	 society	(Gale,	1997).	When	Marcel	Duchamp	put	a	urinal	 in	an	art	gallery	and	called	 it	art,	 the	bourgeois	sensibility	was	deeply	offended	and	profoundly	confused	(Naumann,	1999).	Many	people	may	not	have	 liked	 labour	protests	or	suffragette	rallies,	but	 they	were	easily	understandable	as	a	call	 for	representation	in	milieu	of	generally	growing	democracy.	An	aestheticized	urinal,	on	the	other	hand,	could	act	as	a	cognitive	disruption	to	the	rationalized	social	relations	themselves.	In	historical	terms,	it	is	a	short	jump	from	the	rebellion	of	the	Dada	movement	to	its	conceptual	successor,	Surrealism.	André	Breton,	who	had	been	on	the	margins	of	the	Dada	movement,	was	ini-tially	inspired	by	his	friend	Jacques	Vaché	who	was	noted	for	his	enmity	toward	bourgeois	values,	his	social	indifference,	and	his	willingness	to	buck	convention	(Polizzotti,	1998).	Vaché	and	Breton’s	counter-conduct	famously	 included	setting	out	a	picnic	dinner	in	the	orchestra	at	the	Théâtre	des	Folies-Dramatique	and	engaging	in	lively	dinner	conversation	to	the	theatre	spectators’	amazement	(ibid.).	 And	 such	 disruptive	 efforts	were	 taken	 up	 again	 two	 generations	 later	 by	 Chilean	writer	Roberto	Balaño	and	his	peers	in	Infrarrealismo	who	would	crash	literary	events	and	undermine	the	proceedings	with	boisterous,	animated	conversations	(ibid.).	Other	than	these	acts	of	social	disrup-tion,	 the	 efforts	 of	 Surrealism	were	predicated	upon	a	pseudo-Freudian	 assumption	 that	 the	 real	movements	of	the	modern	mind	had	been	clouded	by	social	conventions	and	that	an	effort	at	“psy-chic	automatism,”	through	verbal,	written,	“or	in	any	other	manner,”	could	express	the	real,	hidden	“functioning	 of	 thought”	 unmediated	 by	 the	 conducting	 force	 of	 social	 propriety	 (Breton,	 1924).	Such	an	effort	is	not,	prima	facie,	a	particularly	threatening	act	of	social	dissention	against	a	society	that	 had	 quickly	 absorbed	 the	 implications	 of	 Freud	 and	 the	 subconscious.	 However,	 when	 set	against	the	backdrop	of	a	political/economic	system	that	had	just	undertaken	the	greatest,	deadli-est	war	in	history	and	was	on	the	edge	of	the	precipice	of	the	Great	Depression,	the	Surrealist	mo-dus	operandi	began	as	a	significant	cognitive	challenge	to	the	prevailing	ideological	hegemony.	Sur-realism	posed	such	a	significant	threat	to	emerging	modern	social	hierarchy	that	 its	 leaders	were	condemned,	in	the	end,	as	vocally	by	the	left	as	they	were	by	the	right	(Polizzotti,	1998).	The	idea	that	 one	 can,	 through	methods	 of	 automatism,	 unleash	 some	 hidden	 kernel	 of	 authentic	 thought	
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which	 hasn’t	 been	 disciplined	 and	 habituated	 (or	 in	 other	 words,	 conducted)	 to	 the	 demands	 of	bourgeois	society,	may,	in	fact,	be	a	deeply	threatening	prospect	to	prevailing	structure	of	power.		The	Situationists	were	the	conceptual	descendants	of	Dada	and	Surrealism.	However,	this	group	of	dissenters	were	more	explicitly	political	 in	 the	general	sense,	 though	 ferociously	anti-orthodox	and	anti-party	in	their	approach	to	the	political	realm	(Hussey,	2002).	By	the	1950s,	when	the	gen-eration	of	the	Situationists	came	to	the	fore,	a	lot	more	blood	had	been	spilt	 in	the	name	of	main-stream,	orthodox	ideologies,	and	as	a	result	there	were	more	reasons	than	ever	to	distrust	the	ac-cepted	methods	of	revolt	and	protest.	One	of	the	goals	of	Situationism	was	to	“brutally	shatter”	the	“prevailing	sensibilities”	and	the	“great	collective	 illusions”	that	had	generated	“thousands	of	pre-packaged	 ideologies	 sold	by	 consumer	 society	 like	 so	many	portable	brain-scrambling	machines”	(Vaneigem,	1967).	Set	against	the	backdrop	of	what	Guy	Debord	(1967)	referred	to	as	a	“society	of	spectacle,”	 (a	 sort	 of	 ideologically	 enveloping	version	of	 the	 consumption	ethic),	 the	 Situationists	imagined	forms	of	activity	and	protest	that	would	radically	upset	people’s	blind,	zombie-like	obedi-ence	toward	the	social	mores	that	had	been	established	by	prevailing	ideologies	on	both	the	left	and	the	right.	Vaneigem	and	Debord	(1967)	envisioned	breaking	through	this	‘power	as	conducting’	by	recalibrating	everyday	situations	in	a	way	that	would	lead	to	a	“revolution	of	everyday	life.”		Guy	Debord	became	famous	(and	to	some	degree	infamous)	for	initiating	the	graffiti	slogan	“ne	travaillez	jamais”	(Never	Work),	a	slogan	that	became	one	of	the	intellectual	symbols	of	the	Situa-tionists’	effort	(Cunningham,	1970).	Obviously	opposed	to	the	drives	of	Capitalism,	the	Situationists	were	also	reacting	strongly	to	the	way	in	which	left	ideologies	had	promoted	mindless	production	and	consumption.	In	Vaneigem’s	(1967)	words,	the	First	International	had	turned	“its	back	on	art-ists	by	making	workers’	demands	the	sole	basis	of	a	project	which	Marx	had	nevertheless	shown	to	concern	all	those	who	sought,	in	the	refusal	to	be	slaves,	a	full	life	and	total	humanity”	(p.	10).	The	rejection	 of	 work	was	 a	 fundamental	 protest	 against	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 cognitive	 certainties	 of	modern	life—the	idea	that	we	are	defined	by	(in	Marxist	terms)	our	methods	and	relations	of	pro-duction,	 or	 (in	 capitalist	 terms)	we	 are	 successful	 as	 a	 society	 or	 as	 individuals	 by	 our	 continual	creation	of	material	wealth.		When	the	 ’68	student	rebellion	erupted,	the	Situationists	were	a	major	inspiration	for	many	of	the	 young	 rebels,	 and	 this	 involvement	made	 the	 student	 insurgency	 particularly	 disruptive	 at	 a	cognitive	level	precisely	because	of	its	lack	of	orthodoxy	(Bracken,	1997).	Violence	seemed	to	erupt	in	multiple	locations	at	once,	it	attached	itself	to	no	party	or	specific	kind	of	political	goal,	and	when	the	government	and	the	media	looked	for	the	movement’s	leaders	they	were	shadowy	and	elusive	(Hussey,	2002).	To	add	to	the	decentred	nature	of	the	insurrection,	the	perceived	leaders	of	the	Sit-uationist	International	refused	to	be	interviewed,	thrown	into	the	spotlight,	or	define	the	rebellion’s	goals	or	desires.	Besides	 the	 slogan	 “Never	Work,”	 other	 troublingly	 unorthodox	 rallying-cries	were	 appearing	such	as	“Boredom	is	Counterrevolutionary,”	“Don’t	beg	for	the	right	to	 live	–	take	 it,”	“Reform	my	Ass,”	“Workers	of	all	countries,	enjoy!,”	“Be	realistic,	demand	the	impossible,”	and	“I	take	my	desires	for	 reality	because	 I	believe	 in	 the	reality	of	my	desires”	 (Hussey,	2002).	Such	slogans	speak	of	a	dissent	 that	 refuses	 to	be	 slotted	 into	 the	 traditions	of	 political	 or	 economic	protest,	 and	yet	has	deep	political	 and	 economic	 goals.	 These	 goals	 seek	nothing	 less	 than	disrupting	not	 just	 the	 so-called	 ‘superstructure’	 of	 hegemony	but	 challenging	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 ideological	 hegemony	itself	 seeps	 into	 everyday	 life	 and	 conditions	 our	 sense	 of	 conformity,	 regularity,	 and	 obedience.	The	orthodox	politicians	and	citizens	of	Europe	could	easily	process	the	customary	political	battles	that	usually	had	clear	and	understandable	goals	 such	as	 reductions	 in	 the	workweek,	democratic	reforms,	 fairer	taxation,	etc.	However,	a	rebellion	against	work	itself	and	the	structures	that	were	perceived	 to	maintain	order	and	societal	 cohesion,	was	an	entirely	different,	 and	 for	many	an	 in-
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compressible,	matter.	 It	 is	 interesting	 that	one	of	 criticisms	 that	was	widely	 leveled	at	 the	 recent	Occupy	 Movement	 was	 that	 it	 lacked	 a	 central,	 organized	 structure,	 and	 its	 specific	 goals	 were	largely	unclear.	Unlike	the	case	for	Situationism,	these	ambiguities	of	the	Occupy	Movement	were	widely	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 fundamental	weakness.	 However,	 the	 differences	 between	 a	movement	like	Occupy	and	Situationism,	are	significant.	Even	 if	 the	specific	policy	goals	of	Occupy	were	not	necessarily	 clear	or	widely	understood,	 the	general	 thrust	of	 its	efforts	were:	a	 society	of	greater	economic	equality	and	political	fairness.	These	are	demands	that	are	easily	processed	even	by	the	most	recalcitrant	capitalist	or	right-winger.	Situationism,	on	the	other	hand,	had	elusive	goals,	but	the	movement	was	simultaneously	violent	and	its	demands	very	far	reaching.	Instead	of	simply	of-fering	 a	 critique	 of	 capitalism	 or	 the	 established	 political	 parties,	 the	 Situationists,	with	Molotov	cocktails	and	slogans	like	“Never	Work,”	were	presenting	a	destabilizing,	and	some	might	say	exis-tentialist,	threat	to	the	system	as	it	was.	While	Foucault	(1978)	explored	forms	of	resistance	to	conduct	within	the	Catholic	and	Christian	pastorate,	 from	 the	Middle	Ages	 through	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	Vaneigem	similarly	 looked	 to	 the	history	 of	 the	 Church	 as	 a	 place	 of	 behavioural	 contestations.	 In	The	Movement	of	the	Free	Spirit,	Raoul	 Vaneigem	 (1986)	 briefly	 charts	 the	 path	 of	 a	 number	 of	 heretical	movements	 such	 as	 the	Brethren	of	the	Free	Spirit,	the	Cathars,	and	the	Waldensians.	These	potentially	counter-conductive	movements	were	seeking	a	space	beyond	that	which	is	“governed	by	the	spirit	of	power	and	profit,”	the	essential	guides	of	the	Church	and	its	host	of	aristocratic	supporters.	For	Vaneigem	(1986),	the-se	movements	were	an	important	inspiration	for	a	time	when	the	hegemony	of	the	medieval	church	had	essentially	morphed	into	a	like-minded,	and	apparently	all-encompassing,	ideology	of	control.	Foucault	(1978)	argued	that	“the	greatest	revolt	of	conduct	the	Christian	West	has	known	was	that	of	Luther,	and	we	know	that	at	the	outset	it	was	neither	economic	nor	political,	notwithstanding	the	connections	 that	 were	 immediately	 established	 with	 economic	 and	 political	 problems”	 (p.	 260).	Vaneigem	 (1986)	 believed	 that	 the	 spiritually-inspired	 counter-conduct	 of	 heretical	 sects	 was	 a	model	 for	 situational	 rebellion	against	a	 late-capitalism	 that	demands	 the	subsumption	of	human	freedom	 and	 expression	 into	 the	 spectacle	 of	 commodity	 relations.	While	 Foucault	 (1968)	 raises	Luther’s	protestant	rebellion	to	the	apex	of	Christian	conductive-dissent,	the	groups	that	Vaneigem	(1986)	 focused	on	 seem	 to	offer	 significantly	more	 counter-conductive	disruptive	protests	 to	 the	hegemony	of	the	Church.	Other	than	a	belief	that	God	is	immanent,	a	doctrine	that	specifically	de-nies	the	power	of	any	church	to	rule	over	an	individual’s	relationship	with	the	deity,	many	practi-tioners	of	Free	Spirit	doctrines	believed	that	a	direct	experience	of	God	could	allow	people	to	trans-cend	 sin,	 leading	 to	 rejections	 of	 dualism,	 and	 practices	 such	 as	 mysticism	 and	 even	 free	 love	(Vaneigem,	1986).	Such	ideas	were	significantly	more	radical	and	cognitively	disruptive	than	those	offered	by	Luther	 in	as	much	as	 this	was	a	brand	of	heresy	 that	not	only	rejected	the	established	church	but	rejected	the	very	idea	of	a	church	altogether.		There	are	elements	of	nostalgia	and	hedonism	 in	Vaneigem’s	Situationalist	 advocacy	 that	now	might	seem	to	some	like	a	reflection	of	late	twentieth-century	inspired	hippie	culture,	particularly	in	 its	 call	 for	 immediacy	 and	 exuberance.	 But	what	 is	 important	 here	 is	 the	 rejection	 of	 a	 Chris-tian/capital	 ethic	which	alienates	people	 from	 their	own	experiential	 lives	 for	 the	sake	of	distant	material	rewards	or	post-mortem	spiritual	dividend.	This	kind	of	dissent	 is	perhaps	precisely	 the	kind	that	Foucault	(1978)	was	searching	for	when	he	talked	about	“forms	of	resistance	to	power	as	conducting.”	If	the	power	of	prevailing	hegemony	is	akin	to	a	border	collie	herding	sheep	in	particu-lar	directions	at	the	various	whistles	of	the	shepherd,	the	effort	of	Situationism	is	not	unlike	firing	a	gun	at	the	entrance	to	the	paddock	in	order	to	viscerally	grip	the	emotions	of	the	sheep	and	send	them	hurtling	in	the	opposite	direction.		
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One	of	the	things	that	makes	this	Situationist	protest	cognitively	disruptive	is	that	it	attacks	both	the	capitalist	ethic	as	well	as	capitalism’s	oppositional	ideologies	of	Marxism	and	socialism	(or	what	the	Situationists	often	referred	to	as	the	ideology	of	bureaucracy)	(Debord,	1967).	One	of	the	cen-tral	themes	of	this	protest	is	its	rejection	of	the	conceptual	reduction	of	human	beings	to	the	status	of	producers	and/or	consumers.	The	Situationists	were	inspired	in	their	conceptual	challenge	to	the	degradation	of	 human	diversity	by	 the	work	of	Dutch	 theorist	 Johan	Huizinga,	whose	1938	book	
Homo	Ludens	shifted	 the	defining	aspect	of	human	consciousness	and	 spirit	 away	 from	work	and	onto	play	(Hussey,	2002).	A	similar	idea	was	taken	up	by	Georges	Bataille	(1949)	in	La	Part	Maudite,	which	contends	that	it	is	our	leisure	choices,	those	things	that	we	do	with	our	“left-over”	time	and	energy,	 rather	 than	our	 labour,	 that	defines	who	we	are.	While	we	are	 continually	 conducted	 to-ward	work	and	consumption	by	both	right-	and	left-wing	ideologies,	the	Situationists	looked	to	dis-rupt	 our	 thoughtless	 acceptance	 of	 this	 conductive	 hegemony	 of	 the	 essential	 human	 labourer	through	moments	of	incongruent	behaviour	which,	precisely	through	their	apparent	nonsensicality,	raised	 the	questions	of	 ‘By	whom	do	we	consent	to	be	directed	or	conducted?	How	do	we	want	to	be	
conducted?	Towards	what	do	we	want	to	be	led?’	And	perhaps	through	this	break	in	continuity,	con-ducting	us	back	toward	what	they	perceived	as	some	more	authentic	human	expression.	It	 is	difficult,	 if	not	 impossible,	 to	 truly	comprehend	the	degree	 to	which	 the	Situationists	con-tributed	to	the	movements	of	counter-conduct	in	which	they	took	part	and	for	which	they	were,	to	some	degree	at	least,	an	inspiration.	It	is	also	difficult	to	say	where	the	Situationist	movement	(and	its	progenitors)	were	on	the	conductivity	spectrum.	Were	they	only	an	anarchistic	and	chaotic	dis-ruptive	force,	or	were	they	ultimately	pointing	people	in	a	specific	(or	even	general)	direction,	con-ducting	them	toward	a	certain	kind	of	vision?		If	 we	 are	 to	 take	 the	 work	 of	 Guy	 Debord	 seriously,	 these	 questions	 can’t	 be	 adequately	 an-swered	because	they	are	too	quickly	absorbed	into	the	Spectacular	society,	which	is	“the	world	that	cannot	be	verified”	(Debord	in	Hussey,	2002).	One	can	make	a	coherent	argument	that	the	central	operating	principle	of	Situationism	is	difficult	to	characterize	as	conductive	at	all,	since	Guy	Debord	(if	not	 the	other	primary	Situationists)	abhorred	what	he	saw	as	reformism	(“Reform	my	Ass”),	a	principle	that	he	thought	even	radicals	like	Sartre	and	Foucault	embodied	(Hussey,	2002).	The	fact	that	Debord	is	now	fodder	for	academic	discourse	within	a	continuing	spectacle	is,	arguably,	proof	positive	that	the	Situationist	effort	to	take	society	in	a	new	direction	was,	finally,	a	failure.	However,	we	can	also	look	at	the	problem	of	counter-conduct	and	radical	twentieth	century	dissent	different-ly.	It	is	logocentric	and	indicative	of	the	prevailing	hegemony	to	only	see	dissent	in	terms	of	tangible,	or	measureable	results.	If	Dada,	Surrealism,	or	Situationism	teach	us	anything,	it	might	be	that	the	spirit	of	cognitive	disruption	must	be	continually	reborn.		This	notion	of	 counter-conduct,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Situationists	and	 their	predecessors,	offers	a	radically	different	kind	of	protest	against	 the	prevailing	hegemony	than	traditional	modes	of	pro-test.	While	the	latter	tend	to	focus	on	specific	 issues	of	perceived	injustice	and	offer	up	bracketed	critiques	 of	 socioeconomic	 relations,	 the	 Situationists	 communicated	 a	 critique	 through	 their	 ac-tions	themselves.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Situationists,	Surrealists,	or	Dadaists	didn’t	communi-cate	sophisticated	and	important	critiques	of	the	structures	of	power	in	their	books	and	pamphlets,	but	 their	acts	of	counter-conduct	were	also	expressed	 in	what	we	might	call	acts	of	performative	communication.	By	undertaking	actions,	the	intention	of	which	were	to	disrupt	people’s	comforta-ble	or	uncritical	 (one	might	 even	 say	 automatonic)	 every-day	 experiences,	 the	 Situationists	were	communicating,	through	their	own	unconventional	responses	to	experience,	a	critique	of	what	was,	thereby	setting	the	stage	for	imagining	what	might	be.	The	community	around	the	activists	of	Dada-ism,	Surrealism,	and	Situationism,	were	entirely	prepared,	both	culturally	and	intellectually,	to	un-derstand	 and	 process	 traditional	 critiques	 of	 the	 injustices	 and	 inequalities	 of	 European	 society.	
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However,	by	communicating	their	critiques	through	apparently	 irrational	and	radically	disruptive	behaviour,	the	Situationists	in	particular	were	offering	a	kind	of	counter-conduct	that	threatened	to	be	un-processable,	 that	 couldn’t	 be	neatly	 expressed	 and	 easily	 countered	with	 arguments	 about	tradition	 and	 order.	 The	 notion	 of	 radical	 performative	 communication	 has	 been	 repeated	 only	minimally	in	contemporary	society	(with	the	Occupy	Movement	as,	arguably,	the	best	example),	but	it	has	the	potential	to	articulate	critiques	of	capitalist	hegemony	that	so	far	have	fallen	on	deaf	ears,	or	more	properly	have	simply	been	boxed	up,	processed,	and	explained	away.			
Notes		1.	Foucault’s	notion	of	counter-conduct	faces	some	theoretical	problems.	The	idea	of	re-evaluating	acts	of	dissent	or	rebellion	in	terms	of	the	form	of	power	they	are	reacting	against	necessarily	pre-sents	some	conceptual	challenges.	Whether	it	is	through	acts	of	coercion,	organic	authority,	or	sim-ple	administration,	it	is	easy	to	see	the	manner	in	which	“conducting”	people	might	involve	the	ex-ercise	 of	 power.	However,	 though	 it	 is	meant	 to	 imply	dissent	 against	 some	existing	 structure	 of	power,	the	idea	of	“counter-conduct”	might	equally	connote	the	exercise	of	power,	even	if	 it	 is	di-rected	away	from	some	existing	hegemony.	The	way	in	which	we	might	envision	the	least	exercise	of	coercive	power	in	this	regard	is	through	the	presentation	of	alternatives	manifested	in	dissenting	actions.	This	idea	forms	a	major	part	of	this	essays	conceptual	thread.	2.	This	 idea	resembles	Foucault’s	(1966)	notion	of	 ‘episteme’	as	described	in	Les	mot	et	les	choses:	
Une	archéologie	des	sciences	humaines	(The	Order	of	Things),	as	well	as	the	notion	of	paradigms	in	Thomas	Kuhn’s	(1962)	The	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions.		
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Appendix	A:	Alternative	Abstract	
	Foucault’s	notion	of	counter-conduct	offers	an	interesting	and	challenging	way	to	reimagine	dissent.	This	essay	briefly	examines	how	certain	kinds	of	dissent	are	uniquely	challenging	to	systems	and	institutions	because	 they	 are	not	 easily	 subsumed	by	 the	 system	or	 its	perceived	 (or	 traditional)	contraries.	An	 important	 example	of	 this	kind	of	dissent	was,	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	Dada,	Surrealist,	and	Situationist	movements,	which	don’t	simply	point	(or	conduct)	people	to	a	standard	and	easily	 imagined	alternative	to	 the	prevailing	hegemony,	but	seek	to	radically	disrupt	 the	way	people	see	 the	world	 through	different	kinds	of	conduct	which	are	 fundamentally	contrary	 to	 the	prevailing	order.				 	
